The Washington Post article from last Friday about the White House’s search for a “war czar” or “execution manager” has provided fodder for comics and pundits around the world.  Most commentators feel the job description is one that someone already in government should have, often stating the obvious about the President being Commander-in-Chief.  Further ridicule derives from the fact that at least five retired generals have turned down the job.  Two things are revealing about this proposal that haven’t been given full voice.  The first thing is the attempt to eliminate bureaucratic inefficiency by adding additional layers.  The second is the visceral need to reach for a military solution when a non-military solution is required.

According to the Washington Post article, the execution manager would have the rank of assistant to the President and report directly to him.  The execution manager would require daily updates with military commanders and ambassadors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then bring their issues to various Cabinet secretaries through designated deputies for follow-through.  Leaving aside the time differences between Washington, Iraq, and Afghanistan, I submit that an extra daily meeting is not what any of these senior executives need in their schedule.  At the risk of stating the obvious, these are very busy people with very busy staffs.  The last thing they need is to spend additional man-hours preparing for a daily briefing to inform someone whose only clout is the “ear of the President” about needs they have already addressed through their own chains-of-command. 

The execution manager cannot force various Cabinet secretaries to act without involving the President.  The fact that he would have to intervene speaks to the fact that the position is not required.  What is required is for the various departments involved in the reconstruction of Iraq to play well together.  That is to say, it shouldn’t take someone from the White House to get Defense, State, national intelligence assets, and other agencies to cooperate.  There already exist a myriad of deputy and under-secretary level interagency meetings.  Why create another one?

Lastly, it is telling that the first people reached for by the administration are retired generals.  It speaks not only to the tremendous respect for their expertise and opinion that is well deserved, but also to a disturbing lack of it among diplomats and others.  No matter what one thinks of the current state of progress on the war, there is no doubt that the military is executing its operations competently.  It has advantages in this.  It can force people to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, something the State Department cannot.  It has clear rules of engagement for use of force.  What the military needs is not another requirement to brief an administration official.  What it needs is for the other agencies involved in Iraq to step up their game.  Instead of reaching for the military solution, i.e. a general, why not raise the bar for the rest of the government?